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Fire or Ice? A Critical Assessment of the Underlying Views 
Kelly Burns* and Imad Moosa 
School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT, Australia 
Abstract: A debate is raging on whether the U.S. is likely to experience hyperinflation (fire) or deflation (ice) as a result 
of post-crisis policies, particularly quantitative easing. Views have been put forward to suggest that the U.S. is heading 
towards ice, while others suggest that fire is the destination. There are also those who envisage either fire or ice, 
depending on how much is done to combat deflation. These views are assessed critically to reach the conclusion that, 
on the balance of probabilities, it seems that the U.S. is more likely heading towards fire. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A debate is currently raging about whether the U.S. 
economy (and the economies of other OECD 
countries) are heading towards deflation (ice) or 
hyperinflation (fire). In the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis and the recession that followed, central 
banks (particularly the Federal Reserve) started to 
pump liquidity into the system via quantitative easing, a 
form of monetary policy whereby the central bank buys 
government bonds with freshly-created money. While it 
is only natural to think that a monetary expansion 
caused by quantitative easing will eventually lead to 
inflation, some economists believe that quantitative 
easing will actually lead to deflation. Others, guided by 
the Japanese experience, believe that it will be 
deflation with or without quantitative easing. Some 
economists think that both outcomes are possible, 
depending on the current and future actions of policy 
makers. Duncan (2012), for example, concludes that 
the price level could either collapse or surge higher, 
depending on whether governments cease quantitative 
easing or, by attempting to prevent deflation, maintain 
quantitative easing, thus generating hyperinflation. 
Likewise Bourque (2012) argues that “whether we have 
inflation or deflation depends on just how much 
governments are willing to do to prevent deflation”. 
The objective of this paper is to examine critically 
the views put forward about this issue, concentrating 
on the U.S. economy, which has witnessed the most 
aggressive rounds of quantitative easing. We will 
examine the arguments for ice, the arguments against 
fire and the arguments for fire. As a starting point, and 
to put things into perspective, a brief description of 
quantitative easing is presented. 
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QUANTITATIVE EASING 
Quantitative easing has become common in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis and the Great 
Recession. The practice involves the creation of money 
and injecting it into the domestic economy, typically by 
the Fed buying securities from banks and other 
financial institutions. The underlying idea is that the 
new money will flow (in the form of loans) from banks 
to other areas of the economy, boosting production and 
employment. 
While central bankers indulging in quantitative 
easing portray the practice as being benign at worst 
and necessary at best, most commentators are 
sceptical of the official line of thinking. For example, in 
its description of quantitative easing, the Bank of 
England claims that it does not involve printing 
banknotes, to give the impression that the policy has 
no inflationary consequences.1 However, there is no 
difference (as far as the inflationary consequences of 
the policy are concerned) between creating money by 
printing physical notes and by doing it electronically—in 
both cases the subsequent increase in purchasing 
power is bound to boost inflation.  
Central bankers also stress the distinction between 
creating money to buy financial assets and to buy 
goods and services, the latter representing a 
monetization of the deficit. The underlying idea is that 
buying bonds from banks is different from buying bonds 
directly from the government—only the latter 
constitutes a monetization of the deficit. Ben Bernanke, 
for example, remarked once that the government would 
not print money and distribute it “willy nilly” but would 
rather focus its efforts in certain areas (for example, 
buying federal agency debt securities and mortgage-
                                            
1http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/qe/default.aspx. 
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backed securities) (Wolf, 2008). According to Robert 
McTeer, a former president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, “there is nothing wrong with printing 
money during a recession, and quantitative easing is 
different from traditional monetary policy only in its 
magnitude and pre-announcement of amount and 
timing” (McTeer, 2010). However, Richard Fisher, the 
current president of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas, warns of “the risk of being perceived as 
embarking on the slippery slope of debt monetization”, 
suggesting that “once a central bank is perceived as 
targeting government debt yields at a time of persistent 
budget deficits, concern about debt monetization 
quickly arises” (Fisher, 2010). He reaches the 
conclusion that the Fed is monetizing government debt. 
In the new edition of his famous book “When Money 
Dies”, Fergusson describes quantitative easing as a 
“modern euphemism for surreptitious deficit financing in 
an electronic era”, which “can no less become an 
assault on monetary discipline” (2010:276).  
Ringer (2009) describes quantitative easing as a 
“dumb and idiotic venture”, considering the “venture” as 
signalling a hyperinflationary strike. There is, however, 
an element of truth in the claim that quantitative easing 
is intended revive the economy, except that no central 
banker would say explicitly how it is intended to do that. 
One way to encourage consumption is to boost 
inflationary expectations—so perhaps the main 
objective of quantitative easing is that (boosting 
inflationary expectations). Krugman (2012) argues that 
higher inflation in the U.S. would be beneficial in 
alleviating private debt and encouraging consumption 
and thus recovery. According to Krugman, it is the 
overhang of private sector debt (accumulated during 
the ‘bubble years’) that continues to cripple private 
spending and perpetuate the economic downturn. 
Higher inflation would “erode the real value of this debt, 
deter the private sector from hoarding its current cash 
reserves and therefore promote consumption, 
investment and economic recovery”. So quantitative 
easing may be a deliberate policy action taken to 
create inflation and debase the dollar. 
Krugman is not alone in supporting quantitative 
easing. In an IMF staff position note, Klyuev et al. 
(2009) report that quantitative easing measures 
undertaken by the central banks of major developed 
countries have reduced systematic risk in the banking 
system, improved market confidence and assisted in 
relieving the economic downturn. Other economists 
argue that quantitative easing will lead to a host of 
serious economic problems and that the appropriate 
policy tool is fiscal rather than monetary policy. In an 
open letter to Ben Bernanke, Asness et al. (2010) 
argue that fiscal policies (in particular improvements in 
tax and spending) are the appropriate tools to help 
restore the economy. Unlike Krugman (2012) these 
economists disagree with the view that inflation needs 
to be pushed higher and argue that quantitative easing 
is distorting financial markets. In this sense, 
“quantitative easing by the Fed is neither warranted nor 
helpful in addressing either U.S. or global economic 
problems”. Likewise, Stiglitz (2012) argues that the 
type of stimulus needed to restore the economy is 
fiscal stimulus and financial sector reforms designed to 
boost lending. According to Stiglitz, the announcement 
of QE3 provided a clear signal about the effectiveness 
of quantitative easing as a policy tool. 
The Fed repeatedly says that it can reverse 
quantitative easing whenever it wishes by selling the 
bonds it has already acquired. This sounds like an 
alcoholic declaring with a high degree of confidence 
that he or she can quit booze any time. Just like 
quitting booze is not easy for an alcoholic, stopping 
quantitative easing is not easy for the Fed if “stopping” 
involves selling the accumulated trillions of dollars 
worth of Treasuries. It will be a task of monumental 
proportions to find buyers under the present and 
anticipated circumstances. The Economist (2011) 
makes it clear that “it is easy to start quantitative easing 
but difficult to get out of it”. If the Fed cannot sell the 
Treasury bonds it has acquired from banks, that will be 
effectively a monetization of the deficit. 
ARGUMENTS FOR ICE 
Arguments for ice are based on the proposition that 
the economy is already pushing towards a debt 
deflationary depression as a result of an extended 
credit bubble. The bursting of the bubble will reduce the 
velocity of circulation of money, thereby causing 
downward pressure on prices. High unemployment 
coupled with large and growing amounts of government 
debt is said to indicate that deflation and a subsequent 
depression will occur. Since the Fed cannot continue to 
inflate the money supply via quantitative easing, 
austerity measures become unavoidable. The problem 
with this argument is that in the age of computer-
generated fiat money, there is no limit on the ability of 
the Fed to inflate the money supply. Abandoning 
quantitative easing can only be triggered by the 
realization that the inflation risk is high, which is why 
the Bank of England abandoned the policy in May 
2012, and/or the realization that it is ineffective. 
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According to the theory of debt deflation of Fisher 
(1933), an economic depression is the result of the 
credit cycle, as a reduction in debt results in an 
economic downturn. Fisher postulated that the end of a 
debt bubble leads to a liquidation of assets and distress 
selling. As loans are paid off, the velocity of circulation 
declines, causing a fall in prices and subsequently 
shrinking output and employment. Deflation is a 
characteristic of severe economic downturn where high 
unemployment means that governments find it difficult 
to control debt in the face of falling prices and wages, 
and hence tax revenue. This is probably what 
happened in the 1930s but there is a big difference 
between the 1930s and the present time. In the 1930s 
the U.S. money supply contracted by about one third—
today it is rising very rapidly as the Fed indulges in 
quantitative easing. 
A proposition has been put forward suggesting that 
ice will be the very outcome of quantitative easing—
that quantitative easing will cause deflation. The 
underlying idea is that by reducing returns on 
government bonds, quantitative easing will curtail the 
consumption of those receiving interest income such as 
annuities. For example, Stiglitz (2012) argues that 
quantitative easing will punish consumers invested in 
government bonds and curtail their consumption. 
Reduced consumption and hoarding of cash by these 
sectors of the economy will produce deflation, a 
situation that is exacerbated by an ageing population. 
According to Nevin (2012) quantitative easing in the 
U.K. failed because the negative impact on annuity 
rates forced consumers and investors to hoard cash 
reserves. It is also argued that quantitative easing can 
impact consumer and producer sentiment negatively, 
which promotes a deflationary environment. McTeer 
(2010), for example, argues that the use of the term 
“quantitative easing” has a significant impact on 
consumer confidence that drives down stock prices, 
giving rise to an adverse wealth effect. This argument 
is not convincing in the sense that low interest rates 
should encourage consumption rather than the other 
way round. The reason why this is not happening is the 
classic “you can take the horse to the water but you 
cannot force it to drink”.2 Furthermore, there are two 
reasons why low interest rates are unlikely to have an 
adverse effect on consumption. The first is that low 
interest rates provide a boost for the bond market, 
                                            
2That is, low interest rates do not represent a necessary and sufficient 
condition for increased demand for credit and a consequent boost to 
production and employment. 
creating a positive wealth effect. The second is that 
income derived from interest payments represent a 
small fraction of the total economy compared to wages 
and salaries.  
Some observers contend that the U.S. economy is 
already in a deflationary phase and that quantitative 
easing is merely postponing an inevitable debt-
deflation depression. The deflationary depression, 
according to this argument, is inevitable because large 
amounts of government debt mean that quantitative 
easing is not sustainable. Chapman (2010) cites 
evidence indicating that the U.S. has been in a 
deflationary state since 2002 and that the provision of 
massive amounts of money and credit via quantitative 
easing is merely postponing a deflationary depression. 
The indicators for this state of affairs include depressed 
consumption, close to zero interest rates, a high 
unemployment rate and a weak dollar. Bourque (2012) 
argues that the world is already in a deflationary 
economic period as a result of “too much government 
and personal debt, hyper-speculation and aging baby 
boomers moving beyond their peak spending years”. 
He argues that the contraction of the world economy is 
being fended off by governments that are trying to 
secure their positions by quantitative easing measures 
that are intended to “shake the world out of its 
deflationary mood”.  
Several economists put forward the argument that 
as soon as large amounts of government debt make 
quantitative easing no longer viable, deflation and 
economic downturn will follow. Chapman (2010) argues 
that the continued creation of government debt and 
monetization of the deficit by the Fed means that “a 
deflationary collapse, one way or another, is 
inevitable”. Duncan (2012) argues that current 
economic conditions are similar to those that resulted 
in the Great Depression (caused by large fiat-money-
denominated credit bubbles) which were described by 
Fisher (1933) as debt-deflation dynamics. These 
conditions threaten a “New Great Depression” should 
government intervention cease. He goes on to say that 
as soon as the government withdraws stimulus or “the 
governments capacity to provide any more stimulus is 
exhausted….the deflationary death spiral will resume” 
(Duncan 2012:155). Two points are noteworthy here, 
albeit at the risk of repetition. The first is the big 
difference between the Great Depression and the 
current situation (monetary contraction versus 
expansion). The second is that there is no limit on the 
provision of money via quantitative easing—money can 
be created at the click of a mouse. 
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Another proponent of the ice view is Mankiw (2010) 
who is more worried about deflation and stagnation 
than about excessive inflation. The IMF (2012) warns 
of a “sizeable risk” of deflation and estimates a 25 
percent probability of below zero inflation by early 
2014. Some economists consider headline CPI figures 
as providing evidence for the proposition that deflation 
is more likely than inflation in the imminent future 
(McTeer, 2010).  
One justification for the ice view is that quantitative 
easing has been ineffective in stimulating the economy. 
This means that the realization of the ineffectiveness of 
quantitative easing will force its abandonment, leading 
to deflation. This view, however, does not reflect the 
current state of affairs. The initiation of QE3 in 
September 2012 indicates the belief (of the Fed) that 
quantitative easing can and does work. On 12 
December 2012 Bernanke announced that quantitative 
easing will be maintained at the rate of $85 billion per 
month until unemployment falls below 6.5 percent 
(Fontevecchia, 2012).3 Given how sluggish the 
unemployment rate is, quantitative easing will be 
maintained for a very long time if the unemployment 
target is to be achieved. 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST FIRE 
Some commentators argue that hoarding of excess 
bank reserves will neutralize the potential for inflation 
as the increase in the money supply will be offset by a 
reduction in velocity. Wade and Bilson (2012) suggest 
that hyperinflation is not currently a threat in the U.S. 
because the increase in the monetary base via 
quantitative easing (which has at least doubled) has 
been matched by huge reductions in the velocity of 
circulation. Holland (2012) states that “printing money 
doesn’t necessarily fuel inflation, especially when 
people are paying down debt and banks are reluctant 
to create new credit”. McTeer (2010) contends that the 
large expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet remains as 
excess reserves, which are not used for money-
creating lending and investing. He concedes that 
excess bank reserves (while potentially inflationary) are 
currently not. The accumulation of reserves reflects the 
conservative lending nature of bankers and the 
slowdown in demand from creditworthy borrowers. 
O’Brien (2012) argues that quantitative easing is not 
really printing money, but rather swapping one asset 
(cash) for another (bonds). Thus, “whatever money the 
                                            
3This move has been dubbed “QE4”. 
Fed prints is stuck in the banks”. That money, 
according to O’Brien, “isn’t inflationary as long as the 
banks don’t lend it out”. If banks decided to lend the 
money out, the Fed can respond by “raising the interest 
on excess reserves or require the banks to set aside 
more money”. 
It is true that the massive expansion of the 
monetary base has not (yet) resulted in a 
corresponding expansion in the money supply, a 
situation that can be explained in terms of the simple 
money multiplier model. However, this situation is 
unsustainable because the current reserves to 
checkable deposits ratio is greater than one. Banks will 
go out of business if they do not lend—after all they are 
in the money lending business. The situation is already 
changing, which is confirmed by the figures provided by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. In October 2012 
reserves with the Fed declined by almost 4 percent, a 
massive monthly figure. In the same month the narrow 
money supply rose by over 3 percent. The proposition 
that the Fed can respond to an increase in lending by 
raising interest rates will be counterproductive from the 
Fed’s perspective. Quantitative easing and Operation 
Twist have been implemented for the very reason of 
keeping interest rates low. And because banks’ reserve 
ratio is extremely high, there is no scope for the Fed to 
raise reserve requirements. 
Several commentators argue that quantitative 
easing is not going to lead to inflation because of the 
currently underutilized productive capacity and high 
unemployment rate. Stiglitz (2012) argues that QE3 will 
not cause “serious” inflation because of the economy’s 
underutilized productive capacity. Levine-Weinberg 
(2012) similarly argue that quantitative easing will not 
cause hyper (or even severe) inflation because of a 
high unemployment rate in the U.S. Harvey (2011) 
points out that there is no reason why quantitative 
easing will not lead to a rise in production and 
employment as opposed to prices, as long as excess 
money balances are invested in productive activities to 
meet the new demand. This line of thinking is flawed 
because it does not distinguish between moderate 
inflation and hyperinflation. Reference to spare 
capacity and unemployment implies that what these 
economists have in mind is moderate demand-pull 
inflation. What we are talking about here is 
hyperinflation, which is not an extension of moderate 
inflation. While moderate inflation can be attributed to 
demand-pull factors, hyperinflation is a fiscal-monetary-
political problem that could arise irrespective of the 
cyclical state of the economy. 
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O’Brien (2012) argues that “fears of hyperinflation in 
the United States are almost certainly unfounded” 
because “the countries that have suffered the pain of a 
worthless currency share very little with the United 
States”. Hyperinflation, O’Brien argues, is typically 
associated with war, revolution or terribly bad economic 
policy (such as the land reform in Zimbabwe)—these 
are not characteristics of the U.S. However, O’Brien 
also suggests that “the economic collapse begets a 
collapse in tax revenues”, which “makes the 
government look like a terrible credit risk”. This 
government will be “cut off from international 
lenders…left with a gaping hole in its budget, and no 
way to fill it”. According to O’Brien, the U.S. is in a 
different position because the U.S. (i) does not have 
any problems selling sovereign debt, and (ii) has a 
highly productive and functioning economy. On the first 
point, O’Brien argues that unlike Hungary in the 1940s, 
investors are scrambling to buy Treasuries even 
though interest rates are very low. On the second point, 
he argues that “it’s very difficult to have hyperinflation 
when you still have a functioning economy”.  
It is not difficult to respond to O’Brien’s arguments 
because they are intuitively and factually flawed. The 
U.S. may not have a problem selling sovereign debt for 
the time being for several reasons, the two most 
important being the situation in Europe and the Basel 
accords that encourage the holding of sovereign debt 
by financial institutions. At one time, Greece had no 
problem selling sovereign debt but things have 
changed dramatically as we all know. It is not about the 
situation now—it is about the fact that the U.S. has 
already begun the journey towards hyperinflation. 
Major holders of U.S. Treasuries have already lost their 
appetite for financing the U.S. fiscal deficit. For 
example, the biggest foreign holder of Treasury 
securities, China, reduced its holdings by 9% between 
September 2011 and September 2012. Other countries 
reduced their holdings over the same period: OPEC 
countries (0.8%), Brazil (3.6%), Caribbean countries 
(8.9%), Hong Kong (4%), UK (3.6%), France (7.9%), 
and Denmark (4.4%). The figures do not indicate any 
“scrambling to buy Treasuries” as O’Brien claims. 
Given also the stock of Treasuries accumulated by the 
Fed as a result of quantitative easing, there seems to 
be a glut of Treasuries. It will become increasingly 
difficult to sell U.S. government debt.  
Furthermore O’Brien seems to confuse the cause 
and the effect when he argues that “it is very difficult to 
have hyperinflation when you still have a functioning 
economy”. It is hyperinflation that transforms a 
functioning economy into a devastated one. It could 
happen in a functioning economy if the budget deficit is 
financed by creating money. Israel certainly had a 
functioning economy in the 1980s but it experienced 
hyperinflation. Furthermore, hyperinflation is not 
necessarily associated with war and revolution—
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina had it without war or 
revolution. If anything, the U.S. is currently at war and 
spending excessively on the military.  
ARGUMENTS FOR FIRE 
According to Bourque (2012), the U.S. is engaging 
in excessive quantitative easing, forcing hyperinflation 
as a potential outcome. In an open letter to Ben 
Bernanke, several leading economists warned that the 
planned asset purchases by the Fed “risk currency 
debasement and inflation” and will not achieve its 
objective of promoting full employment (Asness et al., 
2010). Wade and Bilson (2012) suggest that there are 
legitimate concerns over the impact of the huge 
expansion in the monetary base and greater velocity, 
which trigger the potential for inflation to overshoot 
targets in the medium term. Wade and Bilson (2012) 
caution that “expected inflation remaining low relies on 
the faith people have in policymakers” and that 
consumer and business sentiment can change rapidly. 
Inflationary expectations remain a threat because 
policy makers are considering an increase in the 
inflation target or greater tolerance for being above 
target (see, for example, Blanchardet al., 2010). 
Sound arguments can be put forward for why the 
U.S. will experience hyperinflation sooner or later 
because it has gone so far down the path towards 
hyperinflation. An annual budget deficit in excess of 
one trillion dollars requires the federal government to 
sell bonds for the amount of the deficit plus any bonds 
coming due.4 Investors are mostly buying short-term 
bonds, so the Fed will buy any bonds not bought by 
anyone else. The federal government will make sure 
that will happen even if it requires changing the laws 
governing the Fed or the people running it. Right now 
Bernanke seems to be compliant. Government 
spending is out of control and the Fed will keep 
creating money as fast as the government needs. 
While O’Brien (2012) rules out the possibility of 
hyperinflation in the U.S. by using flawed arguments, 
                                            
4If the deficit is calculated on a GAAP basis and by taking into account changes 
in the net present value of unfunded liabilities, the deficit can be as big as $5 
trillion (Williams, 2012). 
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his description of the circumstances under which 
hyperinflation occurs is perfectly applicable to the U.S. 
He refers to (i) a collapse in tax revenue, (ii) the 
government looking like a terrible credit risk, (iii) a 
gaping hole in the budget, (iv) piles of foreign debt, and 
(v) a big chunk of the available cash is earmarked for 
foreign creditors. These are either current symptoms of 
the U.S. economy or it is heading that way.  
The hyperinflation sceptics may say that the U.S. is 
currently going through what Japan has been 
experiencing in the last two decades—after all it was 
the Japanese who invented quantitative easing more 
than twenty years ago. Japan is not experiencing 
hyperinflation but rather deflation. While there is an 
element of truth in this claim, there is a big difference: 
Japanese sovereign debt is more stable than that of 
the U.S. because it is held mostly by Japanese 
citizens, which makes Japan less vulnerable than the 
U.S. to the changing sentiment of foreign creditors. 
Hence Japan is less likely to monetize its deficit than 
the U.S. However, an adverse development in Japan 
will force the Japanese to off-load their holdings of U.S. 
Treasuries, causing further funding problems for the 
U.S. 
Apart from economic indicators, theory and history 
seem to support the fire view. Let us start with the 
theory of hyperinflation. In the crisis of confidence 
model of hyperinflation, the loss of confidence comes 
before and also causes monetary growth. In the 
monetary model, rapid monetary growth comes first 
and causes the loss of confidence. So, it is either that 
too little confidence forcing an increase in the money 
supply, or too much money destroying confidence. The 
status quo is that confidence in the dollar is dwindling 
for reasons other than quantitative easing, but 
quantitative easing is causing the process to 
accelerate. Loss of confidence in the dollar comes 
partly from the collective desire to kill the exuberant 
privilege that the U.S. has enjoyed since the end of 
World War II.  
There are three dimensions to the loss of 
confidence in the dollar: (i) the international reserve 
status, (ii) the currency to which currencies under fixed 
exchange rate are pegged to, and (iii) the currency of 
invoicing and the medium of exchange in the 
international trade of commodities. As far as the first 
dimension is concerned, countries like China, Russia 
and France are just three examples of countries that 
have been demanding the replacement of the dollar 
with something else. International organizations such 
as the IMF and UNCTAD (United Nations Council of 
Trade and Development) share this view and so do a 
number of eminent economists, including Joseph 
Stiglitz. How this is related to the possibility of 
hyperinflation is intuitively simple. As countries refrain 
from accumulating dollar-denominated reserve assets 
(such as Treasuries) the Fed will find it increasingly 
difficult to raise funds by borrowing, not to mention that 
it will be difficult to reverse quantitative easing by off-
loading the government securities it has already 
acquired. The printing press (or the computer) will be 
the last resort. 
On the second dimension, countries that peg their 
currencies to the dollar tend to experience imported 
inflation as the dollar depreciates against other 
currencies—again thanks to quantitative easing. Most 
of the inflation experienced in the Gulf oil exporting 
countries, which peg to the dollar, has been brought 
about by the weakening of the dollar. At least one of 
these countries (Kuwait) has already abandoned the 
dollar peg for a basket peg. Others are likely to follow. 
By abandoning the dollar peg, these countries will not 
need to accumulate dollar-denominated assets. 
The third dimension is that the dollar may lose its 
status as the currency of invoicing and settlement in 
international trade, particularly commodities (most 
notably, oil). It is strange that some observers claim 
that it would take the oil-exporting Gulf states many 
years to replace the dollar as the currency oil is priced 
in. This is a peculiar claim since Iran switched to non-
dollar sales in a short time. As should be expected with 
a depreciating dollar, Iran has declared that it has 
profited from switching to non-dollar oil sales. Other 
countries can see this benefit and switch quickly too. 
OPEC is reportedly looking to price oil in something 
other than the U.S. dollar (Gold Report, 2010). The 
Gulf states have been for some time now thinking 
about a common currency. Given the small volume of 
intra-regional trade and investment, a common 
currency will not be beneficial unless these countries 
use it as the currency of invoicing and settlement in oil 
trade.  
As for history, the U.S. is showing the same 
symptoms as those emerging in hyperinflationary 
episodes. The following causes of hyperinflation are 
applicable to the U.S. economy: (i) excessive military 
spending; (ii) monetization of the deficit; (iii) the desire 
to revive the economy, because this is the declared 
objective of quantitative easing; (iv) spending to bail out 
financial institutions under the notorious pretext of “too 
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big to fail”; (v) external borrowing to fund the fiscal gap; 
(vi) populist policies such as the funding of projects 
under the fiscal stimulus scheme and feet-dragging 
over the real problem of unfunded Medicare/Medicade 
and social security liabilities; and (vii) a political 
framework whereby it is difficult to sort out the fiscal 
mess. 
Dowd et al. (2011) portray a picture of how 
hyperinflation will hit the U.S., arguing that “if the Fed 
persists along its declared path, the prognosis is 
accelerating inflation leading ultimately to hyperinflation 
and economic meltdown”. They predict that the Fed will 
be forced to monetize the whole of the federal debt, 
which requires a rapid expansion of the monetary base. 
For them, hyperinflation in the U.S. is inevitable.  
CONCLUSION 
A debate is raging on whether the U.S. is heading 
for hyperinflation (fire) or deflation (ice) as a result the 
post-crisis policies, particularly quantitative easing. 
Some economists predict ice on the grounds that 
quantitative easing is just delaying the inevitable. 
Others argue that quantitative easing will cause 
deflation because of adverse income and wealth 
effects. Another group of economists argue that ice will 
materialize with or without quantitative easing—indeed 
some believe that the U.S economy is already 
experiencing deflationary conditions. Some of these 
arguments are flawed because they overlook the facts 
that in the age of compuer-generated money there is 
no limit on quantitative easing, that the conditions 
prevailing today are different from the conditions 
prevailing in the 1930s and because it is implausible 
that the low interest rates produced by quantitative 
easing have a negative impact on consumption. 
Arguments against fire are also flawed because of 
the assumption that quantitative easing has no 
inflationary consequences. The argument that fire is 
not a potential outcome because of excess capacity 
and unemployment confuses mild inflation with 
hyperinflation. The argument that the U.S. is different 
from the countries that have experienced hyperinflation 
in the past is not strictly valid, neither is the argument 
that hyperinflation is typically associated with war or 
revolution. On the other hand, theory, historical 
experience and economic indicators provide convincing 
reasoning to support the proposition that the U.S. is 
heading towards fire. On the balance of probabilities 
we conclude that the pro-fire camp is winning the 
debate.  
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